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Amongst the many aspects of jurisprudence, legal practice and the extant
range of institutional forms the law occupies, there is the often overlooked
sociological fact that the law is (amongst these many other things) a civil
institution concerned with regulating and protecting civil and associative
life. And whilst the former is well understood, the latter is usually understood
by social scientists in terms of ‘a coercive form of technical regulation’ that
responds to ‘demands for functional efficiency, market predictability, and
authoritative control’ (Alexander, 2006: 152). As such, the civil role of law
– the way that it ‘translates’ and ‘reconstructs’ struggles over political and
economic power, in terms of basic civil values – is usually neglected when it
comes to considering attacks on another primary civil institution – journalism.
Looking beyond human rights: attacks on journalists and
journalism as a form of ‘civil diminishment’
The usual form of understanding the relationship between law and attacks on
journalism is via how human rights standards provide an authoritative framework
with universalising ambitions to safeguard journalistic practice and sanction
infringements of fundamental rights. And not how state and market power when
arranged against the practice of free and independent journalism can be legally
resisted through an assertion of basic solidarising civil values (what Alexander, 2006:
154 calls legal ‘counter power’). In essence, it is the potential of the law through
its ‘commitment to rules that allow solidarity and autonomy’ to offer civil resistance
to the non-civil forces of state and market power that I am concerned with. And
to put that dramatically it is the charge that state and market forces arranged (in
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whatever form) against free and independent journalism constitutes a form of civil
diminishment that need to be redressed through law.
This is not to trivialise nor fail to recognise that when the conditions necessary for the
safe undertaking of journalism are compromised the consequences are ultimately
and acutely felt by the journalist who might be targeted directly and personally,
or indirectly through attacks and threats directed at colleagues, sources or family
members. Nor is it to suggest that the manifestation of such threats and attacks
against journalists should not be viewed in terms of violations of the fundamental
human rights of the journalist or that any such rights based approach is somehow
inappropriate. Negatively expressed my point is not that aggressions directed at the
person or dignity of an individual journalists do not and should not engage in core
human rights provisions such as the right to freedom of expression, rights to life,
liberty and security, as well as the prohibition of the use of torture, but that there
are other, what we might call societal, considerations that should be made when
considering the application of law to redress attacks on journalism that sit alongside
matters of human rights. In brief, attacks on journalism, have civil consequences
beyond those immediately suffered by the rights-bearing journalist. Which only
leads to a further caveat. These civil consequences are not best understood in
terms of the usual litany about journalism having a democratic and public sentiment
formation role in political and democratic deliberation but should be viewed as part
of a process of civil diminishment. Again the point here is not that such litanies
are inappropriate, but that they do not go far enough in terms of understanding
the meaning and significance of the process of civil diminishment that attacks on
journalists and journalism ultimately represents and which should be understood in
the form of a basic ‘constitutional infringement’ or as an infringement against ‘the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’  (compare Article 38(1) of
the ICJ Statute).
The effects on citizens’ participation in collective civil life
What I mean here is that to attack journalism should be judged at the meta level
of whether such attacks constitute an infringement on the principles of basic law
where those principles refer to the communicative basis of our collective life. As
Harrison (2019) puts it ‘common civil interests are constitutive of the fundamental
issues that define our version of civility and these are best understood as invariant
civil concerns’. The fact then that these invariant civil concerns ‘are unchanging and
ever-present in all civil societies (…) consistently held as simultaneous concerns
by diverse civil associative groups and form the basis of the pluralism we take
for granted in a modern civil society’ points to the need to take into account the
universal aspects of the quality and communicative basis of associative life. That
is beyond narrow political-democratic considerations, and to consider the role
of journalism in relation to the communicative basis of civil association more
broadly. The question at issue here then is not so much about rights and democracy
but rather centres on how attacks on journalism are interlinked with potentially
detrimental consequences for communicative and associative public life per se.
In other words, to perceive journalism as influencing the quality of civil life (its
normative core) is to emphasise the extent to which the participatory capabilities of
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citizens are understood in relation not just to traditional sites of political participation,
but more inclusively in relation to the capabilities of citizens to voluntarily participate
in collective civil life.
The impact on the communicative base of the civil sphere
To put the matter another way, the civil role of journalism facilitates ‘the idea
of self-government by communication’  (Calhoun 2011: 313). For Calhoun this
conception ‘rests on three core claims: first, that there are matters of concern
important to all citizens and to the organization of their lives together; second,
that through dialogue, debate, and cultural creativity, citizens might identify good
approaches to these matters of public concern; and third, that states and other
powerful organizations might be organized to serve the collective interests of
ordinary people—the public—rather than state power as such, purely traditional
values, or the personal interests of rulers and elites’  (ibid., 311). In other words
the communicative circumstances and conditions under which solidarising and
democratic discourse takes place in the civil sphere are determined by how free and
independent the institutions of communication in general and journalism in particular
are to contribute to what Alexander referred to above as ‘a realm of structured,
socially established consciousness, a network of understandings creating structures
of feeling that permeate social life’  (Alexander, 2006: 54). For such a realm to
endure is dependent on the aspirations of the communicative base of the civil sphere
and within that the freedom journalism has to fulfil its civil role in contributing to
the quality and nature of this civil realm of consciousness, understandings and
feelings. As such to attack journalism is to occasion the civil diminishment of social
life manifest as assaults on constitutional settlements, basic law, or the principles of
the general laws of civilised societies.
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